

**RESILIENT
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UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG

Social Contract-building for Peace: Dissonant Duello of Subnational Social Contracts in Cyprus

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The summary findings, and this full report, are available on the project and institutional home websites, www.socialcontractsforpeace.org, <https://www.wits.ac.za/wsg/research/research-publications-/working-papers/>, as well as our partner websites: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/global-policy-centres/oslo_governance_centre/social-contract.html. <http://www.fesny.org/>.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The protracted conflict in Cyprus produced two competing governance structures that nurtured their own competing and ethnocentric subnational social contracts for almost five decades. Competing loyalties of the two communities and their dependence on their subnational social contracts undermines the peacemaking efforts' capacity to design a unifying and resilient social contract that goes beyond ethnocentrism under a federal blueprint. Ethnocentrist social contracts and institutional arrangements have evolved and become entrenched through the peace process, creating strong structures of inclusion and exclusion. The over-dependence of the peace process on high-level negotiations and their failure to effectively address the core conflict drivers, coupled with institutional discrimination of rival governance structures, have not created a conducive environment for broadening and deepening social cohesion across the communities. The case of Cyprus illustrates the importance and interconnectedness of the three drivers of resilient social contract making in reconciling the two rival subnational social contracts in pursuit of a sustainable peace settlement, notably by broadening and deepening the political process, by fostering more inclusiveness in institutions and by building trust as follows.

1. Introduction

The de facto division that taints the political reality in Cyprus had produced a frozen conflict, with two rival governance structures. Due to this political reality, societal and political resources in Cyprus over the past 50 years have been devoted to establishing and strengthening competing subnational social contracts that are ultimately ethnocentric. Thus, the pursuit for a resilient national social contract that will bring together all communities of the island under a unified state has suffered both from neglect and from the distraction of civic and political actors, who simultaneously nurture and serve the development of their respective subnational social contracts. In fact, while the pursuit of a comprehensive settlement on the island calls for a unifying social contract under a federal blueprint, the protracted nature of the conflict over the past 50 years also saw the subnational competing social contracts grow and mature. These opposing dynamics not only inadvertently undermine peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts, but also create competing loyalties, particularly for the actors engaged in elite-level peace negotiations. In other words, loyalty and dependence on the subnational social contract contradicts and undermines the actors' commitment and capacity to develop a unifying and resilient social contract that goes beyond ethnocentrism. If Cypriots do indeed wish to resist the slide towards eventual partition, ways must be found to subsume the existing subnational social contracts under the overriding vision of a resilient national social contract that is built on the concepts of home and hospitality, which is flexible and inclusive, rather than on one built on ethnicity, which is rigid and exclusive.

While many scholars locate the origins of the Cyprus conflict in a dual-ethnic analysis based on historic enmity between Greeks and Turks (i.e., Akçalı 2007) and others locate it in the 1960 constitution, which is viewed as inherently defective (i.e., Adams 1966, Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt 2010), some read it as a failure in nation-building and national integration of 'Cypriots' (i.e., Nimetz 1991, Rizvi 1993) and others as the product of manipulative foreign interests in the region (i.e., Mavratsas 1999, O'Malley and Craig 2001). Generally, the locus of the responsibility for the conflict in these readings is situated either inside, meaning internally to communities, or outside, linked to the selfish interests and conspiracies of external powers, where the two communities are, to an extent, stripped of agency.

However, it is counter-intuitive and reductionist to seek a singular answer or diagnosis to the protracted conflict in Cyprus. Historical enmities, shifting identity narratives, physical and existential

insecurities and anxieties, colonial legacy, the Cold War dynamics, realpolitik interests, the constitutional impositions and defects, the role of international organisations and even personal egos and ambitions of certain political figures have all had a role to play, amalgamating into what we came to know as the Cyprus Problem. Reading the Cyprus conflict and the failed peacebuilding efforts from a social contract perspective, on the other hand, is neither endogenous nor exogenous per se. Innovatively, it subsumes and merges all the above as underlying causes and obstacles (be it polarised Cold War ideologies or ethno-national drives) that undermined the building of a resilient social contract at horizontal and vertical levels. In this regard, the notion of building a resilient social contract provides a multidisciplinary and multi-perspectival window of analysis that is ultimately built on a holistic understanding of trust, contingent upon inclusion; trust in governance mechanisms and their effectiveness, legitimacy and representation; trust in social and public institutions; and trust in inter-group relations.¹ A resilient social contract, more far-reaching than constitutional design or a peace agreement, is closely knit with security, power-sharing, inclusion and social cohesion and, consequently, is integral for positive peace.

This case study and overarching 11-country research and policy dialogue project are informed by a conceptual framing and methodology² that investigates what drives a resilient national social contract – that is, a dynamic national agreement between state and society, including different groups in society, on how to live together. Within this project’s framework, the Cyprus case study assesses three ‘drivers’ of the social contract (Box A) and their inter-linkages in relation to the Cyprus peace process. It frames analysis of the first driver on inclusive political settlements through two core conflict issues that have long been amongst the thorniest issues in the Cyprus peace process, namely, ‘power-sharing’ and ‘security’. The second driver – effective and inclusive institutions – is analysed within the anomaly of the Cyprus context that uncomfortably accommodates two rival governance institutions. Investigating horizontal and vertical social cohesion, the third driver considers dynamics and inter-group relations within and across the two main communities on the island. The study is based on the qualitative and quantitative findings produced by in-depth interviews conducted in the context of the Social Contracting for Sustaining Peace project, the Security Dialogue Initiative and Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index studies conducted island-wide by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD), as well as extensive literature reviews and policy analysis.

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1. Here, trust refers to a constructive positive feeling, rather than merely trust in the predictability of actions. For example, we can observe trust among enemies, because we trust them to be ‘hostile’ or ‘aggressive’. In other words, we trust they will remain our enemies. In ontological security literature, predictability of the relationship can translate into trust in the nature of the relationship. However, this is not how we are conceptualising trust in this paper. Instead, we are referring to positive trust that allows for a constructive and positive relationship based on friendship rather than enmity, which is crucial for fostering social cohesion.
 2. This research was overseen, and this working paper edited, by Research and Project Director, Erin McCandless. For full project framing, see McCandless, Erin. 2018. “Reconceptualizing the Social Contract in Contexts of Conflict, Fragility and Fraught Transition”. Working Paper, Witwatersrand University. <https://www.wits.ac.za/wsg/research/research-publications-/working-papers/>


Background to Project and Methodology

This case study and overarching 11-country research and policy dialogue project are informed by a conceptual framing and methodology³ that investigates what drives a resilient national social contract – that is, a dynamic national agreement between state and society, including different groups in society, on how to live together. Such a contract includes the distribution and exercise of power, and how different demands, conflict interests and expectations around rights and responsibilities are mediated over time through different spheres and mechanisms. Three postulated ‘drivers’ of such a contract, constructed through deeply rooted in evidence-based research and dialogue within the project working group, are that:

1. Political settlements and social contract making-mechanisms are increasingly inclusive and responsive to ‘core conflict issues’.⁴
2. Institutions (formal, customary and informal) are increasingly effective and inclusive and have broadly shared outcomes that meet societal expectations and enhance state legitimacy.
3. Social cohesion is broadening and deepening, with formal and informal ties and interactions binding society horizontally (across citizens, between groups) and vertically (between citizens/groups and the state).

The value of these proposed drivers and their interactions is assessed in these studies for their ability to better understand what went wrong and the prospects for attaining and sustaining peace in a unified Cyprus.

FIGURE 1: THREE DRIVERS OF RESILIENT SOCIAL CONTRACTS



‘Social contract-making’ spheres and related institutional mechanisms – central to the study framing and findings – are conceptualised as follows: Peacemaking (i.e., through a peace agreement or political agreement); Transitional (i.e., sequenced dialogues, commissions, truth and reconciliation processes); Governance-related, including formal mechanisms (i.e., codified structures of government, formal institutions, national development plans, devolution frameworks/policies) and hybrid mechanisms (i.e., where religious/customary/non-state actor and state mechanisms interact); and Everyday (i.e., citizen actions or practices, norms, mores). In this study, the everyday sphere also serves as a litmus test of the extent to which higher-level, formalised agreements or processes represent wider societal views.

3. McCandless 2018.

4. As defined in this study, these are overt drivers of conflict and discord, either historical, or contemporary in nature, broadly agreed by the main parties to drive conflict and discord, that are being disputed in the policy arena nationally, over time, and have resonance for most, if not all of the population. Ideally, they are reflected in formal agreements or mechanisms and enable examination of how state and society address conflict (McCandless 2018).

2.0 Context: From the Fettered Birth of Independence to Division

2.1 State and national identity formation

Cyprus sits roughly 40 miles (approximately 64 km) south of Turkey and 500 miles (approximately 805 km) southeast of mainland Greece, with a population of approximately 1.1 million. The history of Cyprus has been tempestuous, with the involvement of many actors ranging from different empires and nations of the past to regional and global actors of today. Over the past five decades, myriad negotiations and peace-talks have begun and have stalled, fast-tracked, revisited and re-launched with fatigue lined with hope. The contextual analysis in the following historical analysis traces elements of social contract-building across historical milestones dating back to 1960 and analyses why the attempts at reaching a political settlement on the island had failed from this perspective.

In response to violent inter-ethnic clashes that were fuelled by calls for independence, the international community led by the British colonial rulers was discussing the future of Cyprus and Cypriots during the second half of 1950s. On 16 August 1960, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, despite their mutually exclusive aspirations for union of the whole island with Greece (Enosis) and partition of the island into Greek and Turkish sectors (Taksim), found themselves in a political partnership based on political equality under the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) with the pressure of Western alliance at the height of the Cold War. Thus, the newly created Republic of Cyprus, which neither represented their desires nor included them in its 'design', did not generate ownership among Cypriots and lacked unity of purpose.⁵ The RoC, lacking support and constituency, became an 'unwanted child' and the symbol of the 'unfulfilled struggle'.

Overall, the 1960 Constitution, which established a unitary presidential system that built political equality on ethnocentrism and conflated religion with ethnicity, neither was as unitary as the Greek-Cypriots would have wanted nor provided for geographical separation, as the Turkish-Cypriots had preferred. Although the 1960 Agreements that established the RoC as an 'independent' unitary state were the first attempt at building a unifying social contract, they provided a fertile ground for the nurturing of rival ethno-centrist social contracts from the outset by reifying and essentialising identity narratives based on primordial blood relations. Instead of inaugurating the grounds to consolidate cooperation and trust-building, the 1960s social contract divided the political representation of its constituency strictly along ethno-religious lines on all levels. Social and political life was predicated on this distinction of who is a Greek Cypriot and who is a Turkish Cypriot. Media outlets, schools, sports clubs, municipalities and civil service positions were all founded upon this hyphenation. In other words, the RoC Constitution did not allow for Cypriotness to exist above, beyond or without Greekness or Turkishness; legitimacy and citizenship were built upon religion and ethnicity that were imported from the large group identity from the respective and so-called 'motherlands'. From its inception, the vertical social contract that came with the RoC hyphenated and served two constituencies that could only claim legitimacy based on a rigid understanding of ethnic identity, and was not complemented with efforts to build a horizontal social contract among the citizens of the new Republic.

5. "The Republic of Cyprus was intended to function as a state of exception from its very inception; an exception to the principle of self-determination, an exception to the withdrawal of colonial armies, an exception to independence from the 'motherlands' and an exception to the unfettered exercise of sovereignty" (Constantinou 2008:145).

Unsurprisingly, the original bicomunal RoC was ephemeral and its shared governance institutions failed in 1963⁶ because of disagreements over its implementation, constitutional amendments and overriding ethnic loyalties of the two communities that ultimately boiled down to power-sharing and security arrangements.⁷ UN-mediated efforts tried to re-integrate Turkish Cypriots, who in 1963 retreated into self-administered enclaves, into the institutions of the RoC. However, they failed to reconcile security and self-governance concerns of Turkish Cypriots with the representation and functionality concerns of Greek Cypriots, who, being the majority with a more archaic link to the island than Turkish Cypriots, did not consider the power-sharing arrangements based on political equality as fair.

It was during the period between 1963-1974 that Turkish Cypriots started creating their competing social contract in the enclaves. While these 11 years of life under conditions of economic distress and community insecurity were traumatic, it can be argued that it helped build their intra-community social cohesion under homogeneous isolation. The Turkish-Cypriots' confinement to the enclaves brought about a certain political homogeneity, which solidified the call for a separate ethnocentric social contract. This confinement and separation of Turkish Cypriots also made the rest of Cyprus more homogeneous, where the social contract deriving from the RoC effectively served only the Greek Cypriot community. As such, this period from 1960 to 1974 helps underline the importance of inclusion, contact and interaction during the 'infancy' of social contracts on horizontal and vertical levels.

As the clashes continued, a Greek coup was swiftly followed by a Turkish invasion, leading to the island's division in 1974. While the search for a settlement continued through formal peacemaking under the auspices of the UN, the physical division that came with the Green Line was consolidated with demographic division when humanitarian arrangements saw the exchange of populations. Since the division of the island, the breakaway northern part of the island has been administered by the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"), which is not internationally recognised. The RoC, which is internationally recognised as having the sole sovereignty over the island, continues to function as an EU member state with the doctrine of necessity in the absence of Turkish-Cypriots, but effectively only represents the southern part of the island. The analysis provided in this paper is located in this legal and political anomaly.

Moreover, the events of 1974 had a significant impact on the subsequent peace negotiations. Bicommunality under a unitary state that was the basis of negotiations up until 1974 came to include bizonality as a fundamental principle post-division. Today, the principles of bicommunality and bizonality, which mistakably facilitated the growth of competing and exclusionary social contracts that sought to serve and secure one community while questioning the legitimacy of the other, have become the unchallengeable foundations of any potential comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus Problem. The next 50 years turned the island into a "graveyard of diplomats" (İnanç 2010:113) and witnessed a long and frustrating process of inter-communal talks and numerous UN settlement plans, all of which

6. Though the bicomunal composition of the RoC collapsed in 1963, the Republic of Cyprus continues to function and be managed by the Greek Cypriot community to this day, under a 'doctrine of necessity' decree to account for deviations from the terms of the 1960 Constitution. The Republic of Cyprus enjoys full membership of the UN, the EU and numerous other international bodies. The self-declared 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', through which the Turkish Cypriot community manage its own affairs, is only (effectively) recognized by Turkey.

7. Power-sharing disagreements included, but were not exclusive to, voting structures (e.g., abolishment of the right of veto of the President and the Vice-President, and the provisions to replace double majority voting with simple majority voting) and the abolishment of separate municipalities and ethnic representation ratios in the composition of the public service, police and military. These disagreements overlapped and spilled into the realm of (in)security, which was limited not only to physical security (sporadic inter-communal clashes continued and, as the Turkish Cypriots were less organized, less resourceful and smaller in numbers, they started becoming displaced in enclaves), but also included economic and political realms due to structural inequalities and Greek Cypriot leadership's links with the USSR. As such, power-sharing and security were two of the most contentious issues even before the island was divided along ethnic lines and heavily militarized by six armies (Greek Army, Greek Cypriot National Guard, Turkish Army, Turkish Cypriot Security Forces, British Army in Sovereign Bases and UN Peacekeeping Operations).

revolved around several core conflict issues, namely security, power-sharing, property and territory, but with limited participation of society at large.

2.2 Core conflict issues and resilience for peace capacities

There is no doubt that there are multiple conflict issues that underpin the Cyprus Problem, from property and settler issues to sovereignty and territorial adjustment. However, the two core conflict issues, namely power-sharing and security, are chosen for this analysis because they: (i) form the very foundations of the disagreements over the constitution between the two main communities on the island; (ii) have remained intractable since the inception of the Cyprus Problem in 1963; (iii) are both at the root of historical traumas and contemporary concerns of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and have a significantly polarising effect on public opinion; (iv) are intricately intertwined conceptually and empirically; and (v) lie at the heart of state-building efforts in the search for a Cyprus Settlement. Security and effective representation go hand in hand, as a resilient unifying social contract needs to provide both to its subjects. A social contract that abuses (some of) its subjects or does not extend the same security and representation to a group of its subjects undermines its own resilience by undermining its own legitimacy and encompassing ownership. A social contract needs to provide a sense of safety to all who call the geographic territory it claims sovereignty over ‘home’.

Notwithstanding the lack of progress towards achieving a comprehensive settlement on the island for over five decades and the intractability of the two core conflict issues to date, it is important to highlight and capitalise on the elements of resilience for peace capacities. One of the key elements of resilience is non-violent citizenship in general and aversion to the use of political violence in particular. Since the Green Line demarcating the two communities on the island was established with a cease fire in 1964, incidents of violence have been extremely sparse.⁸ The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index⁹ (SCORE) of 2016 shows that, on a 10-point scale, where 10 indicates everyone in society holds strong political violence tendencies, propensity for political violence for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is 1.6 and 0.4, respectively (SCORE 2016). While lack of violence makes the Cyprus Problem a comfortable conflict where death and destruction are not part of daily life, it also normalises the conflict into the everyday and curbs the sense of urgency for finding a comprehensive settlement.

Another element of resilience is the island-wide willingness to engage in political dialogue to understand the perspective of the other community in how to move forward with the implementation of a federal blueprint (SDI 2016), in the context of the agreed bizonal and bicomunal federal framework as the basis for a negotiated settlement.¹⁰ Despite the challenges in ensuring that a bizonal and bicomunal federation will foster vertical and horizontal social cohesion, 73 percent of Greek Cypriots and 84 percent of Turkish Cypriots find this settlement framework tolerable, satisfactory or desirable (SDI 2016). Further, despite the myriad failed peacemaking attempts and the consequent peace fatigue, Cypriots show respectable levels of forgiveness propensity¹¹ and willingness to engage in political dialogue (SCORE 2016). Lastly, since the opening of the crossing-points in 2003, there is safe and easily accessible space – physical and civic – to develop positive intergroup relations. Considering the non-violent tendencies, openness to dialogue, forgiveness propensity, active citizenship orientation and the ease of intergroup contact in its entirety, the enervated peacemaking level can and should indeed capitalise on the more buoyant and generative horizontal social contract-building.

8. In 1996, a group of bikers tried to cross the Green Line as part of a protest against the Turkish invasion. One biker who made it across the barbed wire was beaten to death by a Turkish-Cypriot mob and another was shot and killed by Turkish forces as he climbed a flagpole to take down the Turkish flag (Anastasiou 2014). A few weeks later, a Turkish soldier was killed and another seriously injured by Greek-Cypriot civilians (CNN 1996).

9. SCORE Index findings can be found here: <https://www.scoreforpeace.org>

10. Although a federal solution is the second-best alternative for both communities, where Greek Cypriots' first preference is a unitary state and Turkish Cypriots' first preference is two separate states in Cyprus but both are EU member states, 73 percent of Greek Cypriots and 84 percent of Turkish Cypriots find the bizonal and bicomunal federal solution tolerable, satisfactory or desirable.

11. According to SCORE 2016, on a 10-point scale, forgiveness propensity is 6.

3.0 DRIVER 1 – Political Settlements Addressing Core Conflict Issues

Today, the two communities continue to nurture and mature their competing social contracts on a geography and demography that are effectively divided, while simultaneously ‘negotiating’ how to include the other in a new or reconciled social contract. Over the past 50 years, and particularly since the failed referenda for a comprehensive settlement of 2004 known as the Annan Plan, the Cyprus peace process was kept on life support without any reflection on the chosen panacea (bizonal bicomunal federation) or the method of delivery (elite-level peacemaking behind closed doors). As such, it became over-dependent on formal high-level negotiations, which often disregard, dismiss and silence anxieties and security needs at the societal level. This over-dependence also defers the responsibility of peacebuilding exclusively to the political elite. When we look at the Cyprus peace process from a social contract lens today, its exclusiveness and the disconnect between the vertical and the horizontal levels are easily recognisable. However, when we read the historical trajectory of the Cyprus Problem with this lens, where we can observe persistent repetition of mistakes dating back to 1960 Republic of Cyprus Constitution – which failed to forge a resilient social contract – the repetition of mistakes becomes evident with disturbing clarity.

This section investigates the two selected core conflict issues and how these relate to the peace process. Given that (i) there is no agreed settlement that can provide the new federal constitutional framework; (ii) transitional mechanisms that can provide an operational and concrete opportunity for social contract making are absent; and (iii) the failure to ensure that confidence-building measures are integral rather than peripheral to peacemaking efforts side-lines the ‘everyday’ social contract making sphere at the expense of the ‘high-level’, the peace process itself emerges as the only sphere where Cypriots are negotiating a new unifying social contract. By investigating the way the peace process in general, and peacemaking, which has become synonymous with high-level negotiations behind closed doors, deals (or fails to deal) with the selected core conflict issues, we reflect on its inclusiveness and effectiveness in building a resilient social contract.

The two core conflict issues that lie at the heart of peacemaking efforts in the search for a Cyprus Settlement have been treated from a similarly reductionist and ethnocentric approach within the context of the formal peace process. The ethnocentric parameters of the peace process translate into an ethnocentric give-take format at the high-level negotiations. Rather than approaching power-sharing and security as an integral part of forging a resilient social contract that fosters inclusion, trust, legitimacy and ownership, peacemaking efforts falsely assume rival homogeneous positions, negotiating ‘objectifiable’ concessions to the ‘other’ community. We argue that the current approach to power-sharing and security is reductionist and effectively misses the mark in addressing the needs, fears and traumas of the two communities. While the inadequacy of the ethnocentric and exclusive format in paving the way towards a resilient social contract can be illustrated by reference to the two core conflict issues of power-sharing and security, these are by no means the only domains of the peace process that are inadequate in this manner.

The efforts to conceive a political agreement that would reflect a more unified and inclusive political settlement to address core conflict issues have been hampered through an excessive focus on formal high-level negotiations within a framework of ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’. Cyprus peace agreement parameters are overly dependent on 1977 agreements that no longer adequately reflect current realities, but those parameters are resistant to change due to attitudes that it is too late, too big of a project, or too firmly entrenched. Thus, the exercise has remained largely theoretical, with the political talks that have been going on for decades failing to produce tangible impact on the functioning of institutions or on the daily life of the communities. While great emphasis is being placed on the peacemaking sphere of social contracting, minimal effort is being invested in needed

transitional mechanisms for social contracting. For instance, five decades onwards from the cessation of hostilities, no truth and reconciliation process or formal political apologies to address mutual suffering have been discussed or implemented; nor were effective and institutionalised ways of public participation and deliberation designed to bridge peacemaking with peacebuilding.

However, beyond the fundamental conceptual and methodological problems relating to the content (settlement parameters of ethnocentric bizonality and bicommunality) and the process (secretive, nothing-is-agreed-until-everything-is-agreed approach), the social contract making on the peacemaking level suffers from a structural conflict of interest that is easy to overlook. Specifically, the high-level negotiations process that is supposed to lead to a unifying national social contract is being led by political leaders and public officials who are involved in the process on a 'part-time basis', while their main 'day job' is to manage and further develop the competing ethnocentric social contracts that they have separately established with their own communities. As such, their 'peacemaking mandate' is competing with their 'electoral mandate'. One of the main contributions of the case of Cyprus to this volume is exactly to illustrate this inadvertent conflict of interest between the entrenched realities of daily life that come with a protracted conflict and commitment to peacebuilding. Because of their competing loyalties, the two sides insist on two mutually exclusive approaches to developing a unifying social contract: for the Greek Cypriot negotiators, it is a continuation of the existing and legitimate social contract founded upon the Republic of Cyprus Constitution, which will be amended and extended to (re)include the Turkish Cypriot community. On the other hand, for Turkish Cypriot negotiators, it is a brand new social contract ('virgin birth'), as the former social contract is a reminder of their exclusion in the enclaves, and therefore cannot provide security.

Further, there is a systemic disparity between the pressures on and capacities of the two leaders due to different political systems and governance structures. While the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot lead negotiators, who are the presidents of their respective communities acting as community leaders, experience competing loyalties and commitments towards their respective subnational contracts, these pressures on the Greek Cypriot leader are stronger, as he navigates a presidential political system. Furthermore, the high-level political negotiations behind closed doors create a bottleneck for the peace process, where brokering peace and designing a unifying social contract rest on the shoulders of two community leaders who are pulled in opposite directions. This is tantamount to fragility in the 'everyday' social contract-making sphere, to the extent that political elites, when outside the peace negotiations, due to lack of accountability stemming from secrecy of the high-level negotiations, engage in blame-games against each other in an effort to rally the support of their own communities. As the peace process continues without the inclusion of wider society, positions of the political elite become the positions of the community and their failures turn into blame-games, further polarising the communities against each other and within themselves. Failure to ensure that confidence-building measures are integral rather than peripheral to peacemaking efforts side-lines the 'everyday' social-making sphere at the expense of the 'high-level'. As negotiators resume the peace process where they left from, the cleavages and fractures of each failed attempt at the societal level accumulate painfully. While these dynamics undermine trust and commitment to the peace process, the fragility of the peace process ultimately renders the perception that the final outcome, and hence the cross-communal, professedly unifying social contract, will also be fragile.

3.1 Core conflict issue #1 – power-sharing

High-level negotiations throughout the history of the Cyprus Problem have tried to tackle the power-sharing arrangements within the context of a bizonal bicommunal federal system. Unfortunately, however, the emphasis has largely been on the issue of ethnic ratios in institutional representation¹² and has failed to break out of the ethnocentric and arithmetic approach. Despite the changing regional

12. Power-sharing arrangement of 1960 Constitution was based on 70:30 ratio for civil service posts and 60:40 ratio for military posts, while prescribing that the president was always to be a Greek Cypriot and a vice-president was always to be a Turkish Cypriot, with veto powers.

dynamics and Europeanisation of the Cyprus Problem, negotiations on power-sharing arrangements were more focused on ‘splitting’ power between the two communities rather than on ‘sharing’ power. While the concept of ‘effective representation’ that attempts to go beyond ethnic ratios to ‘operational and everyday power-sharing’ began to play a bigger role in the latest round high-level negotiations that were initiated in 2016, it remains a thorny dilemma how the decision-making responsibilities in governance institutions will be ‘shared’ in a way that is not locked into competing ethnic loyalties.

When it comes to specific topics that have been discussed under the governance and power-sharing dossier, the tug-of-war between ethnocentrism and inclusive governance has been prominent. One such example is the issue of how the federal executive would be elected. While the Greek Cypriot default preferred position had always gravitated around the one-citizen-one-vote principle, in a way that could be expected to favour the majority community in electing a president and vice-president team, Turkish Cypriots tended to prefer separate elections for the representative of each community in a Federal Presidential Council, with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot elected officials rotating between the president and vice-president positions. A possible compromise to overcome this polarisation, often suggested by civil society actors, was to institute a system of weighted cross-voting in electing the federal executive. In short, each community would primarily vote from a ballot of members of their own community, but, at the same time, would vote on a separate ballot comprised of members of the other community, with the influence of the cross-communal vote weighted down so that the influence of one community on the other’s representatives was not inordinate. The primary rationale for weighted cross-voting has always been that it represents a pragmatic approach to gradually overcome ethnocentrism. By needing to secure votes from members of the other community as well, politicians would eventually develop policy platforms that went beyond the lowest ethnic common denominator; instead, they would work toward inclusive service delivery, human security for all and social cohesion in the context of a unifying Cyprus-wide social contract. While bold, the cross-voting proposal was at the same time conservative: the approach acknowledges that voting for federal officials will largely be divided across ethnic lines, but it also creates space for cross-talk between politicians of one community and citizens of the other in such a way that the politics of Cyprus could gradually transcend ethnicity.

While often discussed and recommended through civil society forums from the late-1970s to the present day, the proposal for weighted cross-voting has yet to achieve the status of convergence in the formal peace talks. Although the latest round of negotiations that collapsed in Crans-Montana in July 2017 achieved considerable progress on power-sharing, the issues of a rotating presidency and how cross-voting could be integrated remain unresolved. While some political groups reject the proposal precisely because they disagree with its underlying philosophy – transcending ethnocentrism – others have been opposed due to narrower concerns: for instance, that cross-voting might electorally favour left-wing parties who would find it easier than right-wing parties to build coalitions across the ethnic divide. Even the UN team in Cyprus has been ambivalent about cross-voting, with its support of the proposal waxing and waning depending on what position UN governance experts of each era took on the issue of ethnocentric governance, i.e., whether it was a challenge to be eventually overcome or simply a fact of life in post-conflict societies. Nevertheless, surveys over the years have registered support for weighted cross-voting across majorities from both communities,¹³ who, echoing the support for cross-voting amongst organized civil society, seem to implicitly understand that political leaders who are motivated to listen to the desires and concerns of citizens from all communities are more likely to lead the island toward sustainable peace than are politicians who rally their own ethnicities to consolidate their respective separate, subnational social contracts (Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci 2009).

13. In a 2009 survey, where respondents were asked whether they prefer weighted cross-voting or mono-communal voting, 50 percent of Greek Cypriots and 52 percent of Turkish Cypriots registered support for cross-voting, against 40 percent of Greek Cypriots and 32 percent of

3.2 Core conflict issue #2 – security

The second core conflict issue, that regarding security within the context of the Cyprus Settlement, had also been managed from an ethnocentric standpoint. Security provision in the formal peace process had been, almost singularly, conceptualised as securing one community against the potential aggression or oppression of the other community via security forces (i.e., Turkish troops and guarantees) and restrictions on freedoms (i.e., Greek Cypriots' freedom to reside in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state). When discussing security, the two sides tend to remain entrenched in their historic positions – namely, preference for Turkish security guarantees by Turkish Cypriots and preference for multinational security guarantees by Greek Cypriots. However, both sides have failed to seriously consider what security threats the new security architecture of federal Cyprus would respond to, how such threats can be mitigated preventively and how to eventually transition into endogenously resilient security institutions. Such a narrow and militaristic approach to security fails to respond to the concerns and insecurities of the wider society and leaves little room for a holistic and integrated understanding of security that encompasses personal, community, economic, political and ontological levels.

The attempts to widen and deepen the concept of security had faced strong resistance from scholars and security professionals globally. As such, a similar approach can be observed in the Global Peace Index's conceptualisation of security, where, naturally and expectedly, security is understood from a negative peace perspective. In other words, lack of violence or the level of violence is used to assess (in)security. This is problematic, not the least because it disregards positive peace, but also because the concept of security should reach beyond violence and build on more holistic and wholesome foundations to foster a healthy and resilient social contract. Using the same negative versus positive peace terminology, we could call this holistic approach that is integral to resilient social contracting 'positive security'. As such, the concept of positive security subsumes feeling secure in itself and in relation to its environment as a desirable normative end, rather than as a mere service provision.


While the reductionist and fractured understanding of power-sharing limits the concept of effective representation to elections and headcounts, rather than accountable, participatory and shared decision-making, the narrow and militaristic understanding of security effectively secures one group/community at the expense of the other. Citizens in frozen and comfortable conflicts, such as Cyprus, where violence is not prevalent, can still feel highly insecure, not for their physical being, but for their individual, collective and ontological future. It is at this exact juncture that the concept of positive security intertwines with the concept of power-sharing. For instance, the ethnocentric approach that is singularly focused on Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ratios in the public sphere, disregarded the inclusion of other groups such as women, young people and ethno-religious minorities (e.g., Maronites, Armenians and Latins) in governance structures. Putting aside the obvious moral argument of diversity and inclusion in the name of democracy, justice and equality, there is a utilitarian argument for inclusive and participatory power-sharing arrangements that interlaces with positive security. The groups that are excluded and marginalised by peace processes can become defensive sceptics, spoilers or even radicalised.

For example, The Security Dialogue Initiative's¹⁴ research (SDI 2017) has identified "gender" and "gendered insecurities" as crucial elements that need to be better understood and embedded in the high-level negotiations. SDI findings corroborate that diverse and inclusive decision-making in peace processes and frameworks would not only improve sense of security and yield better outcomes, but also produce more sustainable outcomes that can provide a fertile ground for resilient social

Turkish Cypriots who expressed support for mono-communal voting (Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci 2009).

14. Security Dialogue Initiative, launched in October 2016, is implemented by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development. The findings of the research and its proposals can be found here: <https://www.seedsofpeace.eu/index.php/where-we-work/europe/cyprus/security-dialogue-project/proposal-for-a-new-security-architecture-in-cyprus>

contracts to grow. The quantitative analysis, based on a sample over 3,000 respondents island-wide, explicitly showed that Cypriot women experience heightened insecurities and are most sceptical of the peace process and of the male leaders involved. More specifically, Cypriot women have a heightened sense of intergroup tension and mistrust compared to men and experience higher levels of social distance, negative stereotypes and negative feelings toward the other community. Innately, while their expectation of meaningful social unification and integration between communities, as well as peace dividends, is lower than that among Cypriot men, their fear that the new state of affairs would be fragile, dominated and disrupted by Greek and Turkish interference in its domestic and foreign affairs is stronger. Overall, Cypriot women seem to have more negative expectations about the potential settlement to the Cyprus Problem. The figure below helps illustrate this point. Each score is calculated on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 and 10 represent polar opposites in relation to the indicator. For instance, the Cypriot women score for social distance, which refers to the level of willingness to coexist on a daily level with members of the other community and willingness to accept them as a friend, spouse, boss, neighbour or president, is 4.7, while this score is 4.2 for Cypriot men.



In line with other research, SDI revealed that Cypriot women and men also differed in the ways that they talked about the conflict. Women talked at length about the context of the dispute, particularly focusing on their involvement in the relationship with the other party. They were most concerned about everyday security and talked about fairness in a way that incorporated their need for stability and material interests. Men used more linear and legalistic language and were most concerned about political security. Adopting a gender analysis to improve the resilience of the peace process and to facilitate a comprehensive and sustainable solution in Cyprus is imperative. However, since the inception of the RoC, only three Greek Cypriot women and one Turkish Cypriot woman have so far had any kind of involvement and impact in the negotiations. Unarguably, considering that women’s heightened insecurities translate into scepticism and resistance for the peace process, their inclusion as well as acknowledging their perspectives, perceptions and needs would help address the core conflict issues and make the process more resilient.

4.0 DRIVER 2 – Institutions Delivering Effectively and Inclusively

Cyprus peacemaking efforts have been persistently focused on reconciling the two rival subnational contracts that serve their respective subjects into a new unifying social contract to end the island’s de facto division. Yet, five-decades-long geographic, demographic and administrative separation inescapably leads to the evolution of the subnational contracts that not only excluded the other community, but perpetuated a narrative based on the other’s illegitimacy. In fact, the two subnational social contracts were strengthened despite and in spite of each other: despite the Turkish invasion

of 1974 for Greek Cypriots, and in spite of unrecognition and isolation for Turkish Cypriots. The RoC could not forge a resilient social contract for the two communities until 1974, but it did forge a strong subnational contract for Greek Cypriots post-1974. While Turkish Cypriots sought recognition for the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', Greek Cypriots embraced the Republic.

Since the division of the island, each community has nurtured its own system of democratic governance, providing services and ensuring human rights primarily for the citizens of its own ethnicity. In fact, the separation and homogeneity reinforced the perception of security by creating a physical demarcation from the 'enemy other'. The RoC was very successful in rebuilding itself as a strong service economy in the 1980s and 1990s and in providing effective job and housing opportunities to its large internally displaced population after the division. It also became an EU member state in 2004, which accredited its social contract en par with the idealised Western Europe. On the other hand, although the break-away Turkish Cypriot administration struggled under isolation and unrecognition, it, too, managed to provide a certain level of security and prosperity to its subjects, evident from low-crime rates, non-violent transfers of power, multi-party secular coalitions and a large middle-class population.

Europeanisation of the Cyprus Problem that came with the RoC's EU application on behalf of the whole island added a third identity layer and a regional social contract dynamic into the equation. Although this Europeanisation dynamic was an opportunity that could act as a catalyst to finding a comprehensive settlement by bringing two rival social contracts under a supranational one, neither the RoC-EU accession negotiations nor the institutional relationship with the EU effectively extended to the Turkish Cypriot community. Looking at the EU's role in conflict resolution and capacity in promoting peace, Natalie Tocci argues that, through participation in common institutional structures, actors can reconfigure their perceived interests and collective goals, either top-down through change agents or bottom-up with civil society's support (Tocci 2007). Considering the absence of bilateral relations between Brussels and the Turkish-Cypriots, Europeanisation of the Cyprus Problem triggered a bottom-up change in the Turkish Cypriot community, where the subnational social contract was flexed and Europeanised, but did not facilitate the peacebuilding efforts, as this process was neither representative, nor inclusive, nor treated the Turkish Cypriot social contract as legitimate. Exclusion of the Turkish Cypriot community from the accession negotiations and then from the subsequent accession treaty undermined the transformative potential of Europeanisation. The opportunity to bridge the two rival subnational social contracts under a broader regional social contract instead created a dissonant triangle between the two subnational social contracts that adopted the European element but rejected the legitimacy of each other.

In April 2003, together with nine other candidate countries, the RoC signed the EU accession treaty without a comprehensive settlement on the island. Five days later, in a breath-taking move, the Turkish Cypriot authorities announced that they would allow freedom of movement across the Green Line for the first time since 1974. Almost overnight, the checkpoints on the Green Line that divided the communities for almost 30 years were opened. In response to the Turkish Cypriot move, the Greek Cypriots announced a series of measures to give Turkish Cypriots the opportunity to enjoy the rights and benefits that the RoC extends to 'its citizens', such as medical care, education and Republic of Cyprus passports. On the one hand, opening of the checkpoints strengthened the resilience capacities for peace by easing intercommunal contact and hence facilitating opportunities for social cohesion on the horizontal level and, on the other hand, some of the citizenship rights and benefits that became accessible to Turkish Cypriots allowed for vertical interaction between the RoC institutions and its estranged Turkish Cypriot citizens. As such, although power-sharing and security remained the two of the most contentious issues for the negotiating teams, the liberation of intercommunal contact provided room to complement the vertical social contract-building through peacemaking, with

15. See Cyprus 2017 Human Rights Report: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277397.pdf>

horizontal social contract-building via bicomunal social networks and civil society efforts. The post-2003 era indisputably witnessed a proliferation of peacebuilding initiatives, bi-communal groups and efforts.

While Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots cultivated their subnational social contracts in their respective homogeneous geographies (following the population exchanges in 1970s, only a few hundred Cypriots chose to reside in the 'opposite' administration), the two governance structures largely institutionalised discrimination against citizens of the other community in terms of right to access property, freedom of movement and settlement, free access to health care, voting rights, ethnic profiling at crossing-points, and so forth. For example, according to article 62(1) of the RoC Constitution, 35 out of 50 members of Parliament are elected by the Greek Cypriot community and 15 by the Turkish Cypriot community. Since the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from the RoC in 1964, the 15 parliamentary seats reserved for Turkish Cypriots remain vacant. While the small number of Turkish Cypriots who permanently reside in the RoC can vote for Greek Cypriot candidates or can become candidates in Greek Cypriot political parties, Turkish Cypriots living in the north are not allowed to vote in the RoC. Other forms of institutionalized discrimination against Turkish Cypriots by the RoC include arbitrary delays and refusals of citizenship to Turkish Cypriots who have one Turkish Cypriot parent and one Turkish parent.¹⁶ Similarly, the record of the Turkish Cypriot administrative discrimination against Greek Cypriots is abysmal and goes beyond the property and right to return cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights. For example, a small number of enclaved Greek Cypriots who reside in the northern part of Cyprus can elect municipal officials, but are neither represented nor permitted to participate in the general elections in the Turkish Cypriot administration. The responsibility of institutions to be more inclusive of the other community and its members in the here-and-now is bypassed by citing the so-far inconclusive comprehensive settlement negotiations. Thus, public service delivery has become a vehicle for the perpetuation of separate, subnational and ethnocentric social contracts that reproduce the illegitimacy of the other, and the peace negotiations that are meant to restore inclusivity of institutions are ironically used as a pretext to postpone any actual reform towards greater inclusivity.

Nevertheless, in recent years, both communities have been internally debating whether their institutions should be more inclusive of the other community's citizens and their needs.¹⁷ For Greek Cypriots, this has largely been motivated by EU membership, given that systemic and institutionalised exclusion based on ethnic criteria is incompatible with the EU *acquis communautaire*. Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, have been motivated by the desire to prove themselves as equally European when they faced the stark difference in development and standards after the opening of the crossing points in 2003 and for greater international recognition. Unfortunately, in neither community have these timid steps towards greater inclusivity been conceptualised within a strategy of transition, from separate ethnocentric social contracts, to a unified, Cyprus-wide, resilient social contract.

Turkish-Cypriot failed attempts to secure representation in EU institutions following the accession of the Republic of Cyprus well illustrate how limited these steps had been. In 2009, despite the Turkish Cypriot leader's requests that two of the six Cypriot seats in the European Parliament be left vacant for allocation to Turkish-Cypriots until a solution was reached, all six were filled by Greek Cypriot candidates (Kaymak 2012). Another example epitomising the ostensible nature of these steps is the general reticence regarding public apologies for Turkish Cypriots' suffering in the 1960s and Greek Cypriots' suffering in the 1970s, with only rare and timid exceptions to this general rule. Although recognising and including the pain of the other could contribute to further transitions on the emotive

16. Around 1,000 Turkish Cypriots are planning to sue the Republic of Cyprus on the grounds of discrimination for its alleged refusal to grant them citizenship. See multiple ombudsperson complaints and cases: <https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/02/14/turkish-cypriots-sue-republic-cyprus-citizenship-discrimination/>

17. For instance, although the voter registration and the process was tainted multiple challenges that prevented this step from being effective in including of Turkish Cypriot voters and potential candidates, RoC allowed Turkish Cypriots to vote in the EU Parliament elections for the first time in 2014 by establishing voting centres near the checkpoints.

societal level, the official historical narratives in both communities silence the pain of the other, in effect reducing the existence and the legitimacy of the ‘other’ on the island. This is apparent from the reactions to a speech made by Doğuş Derya, a Member of Parliament for the Republican Turkish Party (CTP),¹⁸ in Parliament on 15 December 2014. In her speech, Derya emphasised that Turkish Cypriots were not the only ones losing as a result of the Cyprus Problem and that there was a need to acknowledge the traumas and sufferings of others. Pointing to the sufferings of Greek Cypriots, Armenians and Maronites, Derya said that, contrary to Orthodox doctrine, the Church had allowed abortions for rape victims in 1974 (see Hadjipavlou 2010). This speech made the headlines the next day, both in Cyprus and in Turkey (Yeniduzen 2014). The majority of commentary on online platforms, social media and in the mainstream media denied Derya’s claims and condemned her for being ‘ignorant’ and a ‘traitor’ for calling the Turkish troops rapists.

Over the five decades, discussions about how institutions will actually provide services and how to create effective mechanisms for inclusive representation and public participation in decision-making have been at best inadequate. These discussions also excluded key governance stakeholders (e.g., political parties, senior civil servants and local authorities) as well as civil society; this forewent the collective wisdom and innovation that come with inclusion and that can break free of the debilitating approach that reduced power-sharing to ethnic ratios. Although there were attempts in 2008 to complement peacemaking efforts with confidence-building packages and technical committees (e.g., technical committees on cultural heritage, criminal matters, health and crisis management), these initiatives remained disconnected and feeble, as the leaders and technical committees continued to withhold information (i.e., on convergence) and there were no public participation mechanisms. As a result, the bicomunal initiatives not only lacked legitimacy, but also lost potency, as they remained limited in their impact and outreach. As Erol Kaymak suggests, even the technical committees that were supposed to bridge the formal peace process with civil society were subordinated to political authority and confidentiality. Consequently, the technical committee work failed to trickle down into public discourse and achieved very little synergy in cross-fertilising ideas with the civil society organisations (Kaymak 2012).

The exclusion of one community in the other community’s governance institutions is also an obstacle to effectively addressing the core conflict issues about power-sharing and security – thus interfering with the ability to nurture a more inclusive political settlement, i.e., driver 1. Inclusive deliberation and consensus building processes yield better and more accepted outcomes, which would consequently facilitate their execution and performance. In post-conflict and conflict-transition, process and performance are intertwined. In other words, ensuring inclusivity in the peacemaking process itself can help address the core conflict issues of power-sharing and security.

5.0 DRIVER 3 – Social Cohesion Broadening and Deepening

To what extent is social cohesion broadening and deepening, with formal and informal ties and interactions binding society horizontally (across citizens, between groups) and vertically (between citizens/groups and the state)? And how is this impacting the design of a new, unified and resilient social contract in Cyprus? In this section, we argue that horizontal cohesion within each community is weak across the two communities, but the opening of the checkpoints in 2003 facilitated intercommunal contact and provided an opportunity to capitalise on resilience for peace capacities. We also argue that failure to reach a political settlement in the past five decades inadvertently broadened and deepened vertical social cohesion by allowing the formation of competing subnational contracts and the institutionalisation of discrimination against the citizens from the other respective

18. The Republican Turkish Party is a left-wing, pro-peace, social democratic political party in north Cyprus, founded in 1970.

community. As such, social cohesion broadened and deepened within each community exclusively, reinforcing the dissonant duello between subnational social contracts in Cyprus.


We argue that vertical and horizontal social cohesion is co-constitutive, as intergroup harmony positively impacts upon citizen-state relations, while effective and inclusive governance institutions that are accountable to their constituents positively impact upon intergroup relations. SCORE Index studies carried out in diverse post-conflict contexts, including in Liberia, Ukraine and Moldova, clearly illustrate the link between effective and inclusive governance structures, security and harmonious intergroup relations.¹⁹ Acknowledging this intertwined and co-constitutive nature of vertical and horizontal social cohesion and designing complementary and inclusive processes to tackle the core conflict issues from this perspective during the peacemaking process, present a significant opportunity for broadening and deepening social cohesion across the communities and paving the way for forging a resilient social contract. While the 1960 Constitution created rival institutions and chambers, it also provided little room for horizontal cross-pollination by ethnically hyphenating social life and interactions, too.²⁰ The lack of ownership and commitment to the new constitution, the societal cleavages among Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots as well as the inherent distrust towards the guarantors²¹ of the new Republic (i.e., Greece, Turkey and the UK as the guarantors of the Republic), coupled with the instability of the regional and international environment due to the Cold War dynamics, hampered the forging of a resilient social contract for the ‘infant’ Republic of Cyprus. The hyphenated vertical social contract that was unitary only on paper was reflected on and exacerbated the cleavages on the horizontal level, which became mutually reinforcing and facilitated the growth of rival subnational social contracts that served a sense of cohesion contingent upon ethnic homogeneity, as it was this conflated understanding of ethnicity that provided representation and legitimacy on the vertical level. To date, this strict hyphenation can still be observed in the peace process, where peacebuilding efforts see only two and rival sides to the conflict, that of Greek Cypriots and Greeks, and that of Turkish Cypriots and Turks.

Failure of the peace process and institutional discrimination against citizens from the other community have exacerbated pre-existing and unresolved grievances from the period of inter-communal clashes. It nourished the historical narratives of enmity and self-victimisation. As a result, horizontal and vertical social cohesion, while independently present within each community, are almost non-existent across the two communities. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, driven by intergroup tension and negative stereotypes of the other, along with feelings of injustice due to institutional discrimination, experience inter-communal relations that, under a superficial veneer of civility, are characterised by deep mistrust. As such, while the island maintained negative peace over the past 50 years, it made little to no progress towards positive peace. Peacemaking attempts that failed to address the core conflict drivers, coupled with institutional discrimination, undermined horizontal social cohesion across the communities and could not effectively capitalise on elements of resilience for peace capacities. On the contrary, a temporal comparison of SCORE Index findings on intergroup relations indicates deterioration in how Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots feel about each other (SCORE 2016-2017).

19. For more on SCORE findings from other contexts, see <http://www.scoreforpeace.org>

20. “The most disturbing thing about being a Cypriot is that one can only be a Greek or a Turkish Cypriot. Postcolonial Cypriot identity is quintessentially and inescapably hyphenated; and hyphenated across a fixed Greek–Turkish axis. Being simply and singly Cypriot is a constitutional impossibility (RoC Constitution, Article 2). Who is Turk or Greek has been decided on the basis of religious beliefs and less, or not at all, on the basis of language or other cultural markers. Maronites, Latins and Armenians had, collectively, to choose at independence to be members of either the Greek-Cypriot or the Turkish-Cypriot community.” (Constantinou 2007:248)

21. The 1960 Constitution that established the Republic of Cyprus came with two additional treaties: 1) The Treaty of Guarantee, designating Turkey, Greece and the UK as the guarantor powers who were tasked with jointly or separately maintaining the state of affairs in the newly found Republic of Cyprus; and 2) The Treaty of Alliance, signed by Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, stating that they would cooperate in their common defence.



The political leadership of both communities has generally failed to address the growing rupture in the social cohesion of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Confidence-building measures, including transitional justice, contact initiatives and daily cooperation, are at best neglected and at worst actively undermined by the two leaderships, who ostensibly have ‘more important things than social cohesion to worry about’, namely the search for a political settlement on the core conflict issues. And yet, not attending to social cohesion makes the core conflict issues all the more difficult to resolve, as has been exemplified in quantitative studies that show a direct association between intergroup tensions and insisting on motherland security guarantees following a settlement, a demand that is unlikely to permit convergence on common ground between the two communities (SCORE 2017). Further, even if the core issues were resolved and a peace agreement were reached on the negotiation table by the elites, this would need the approval of the two communities in respective referenda. The painful experience of the 2004 referendum in Cyprus and other failed referendum experiences (e.g., Colombia) affirm that peace cannot be made on the elite level without constructive and inclusive public deliberation, trust-building and rapprochement on the societal level.

Almost half of all peace agreements signed fail within the first five years, with the rate of relapse increasing every decade since the 1960s (World Bank 2017; Charles 1997). In other words, many peace processes, failing to build resilient social contracts, are achieving unsustainable agreements without peace. MacGinty, Muldoon and Ferguson emphasise, “There is often a dissonance between the peace agreed at the elite level and the interpretation and experience of that peace at the group and individual level” (MacGinty, Muldoon et al. 2006). In parallel, LeBaron, Broome, Hadjipavlou, Anastasiou and Kanol contend that conflicts are not just about territory, boundary and sovereignty issues, but also about acknowledgment, representation and legitimisation of different identities as well as ways of living, being and making meaning (LeBaron 2003; Broome, Hadjipavlou et al. 2012). The importance of a political agreement (i.e., peacemaking as part of vertical social contract-building) for peacebuilding (i.e., as part of horizontal social contract-building) cannot be overstated; however, what happens ‘the day after’ an agreement is equally important (see Kyriacou, Oğuz et al. 2009). The reason for thinking about ‘the day after’ is to stress the need to provide a feeling of security and confidence that the traumas of the past will not reoccur and to facilitate the reconfiguration of intergroup relations from tension to harmony. This points to a gaping hole in the mainstream peacebuilding approach, as ignoring social cohesion and social contract-building limits its capacity to deal with the affective, emotional and perceptual realm of peacebuilding.

Saying 'yes' to a comprehensive settlement, however perfect in its design, means saying 'yes' to confronting engrained societal fears and anxieties and saying 'yes' to living side by side with the 'enemy other'. It effectively requires Cypriots to accept the other as a legitimate partner and as a group that is part-self who also has rights and has also suffered. It is at this juncture that resilience for peace capacities that are integral to resilient social contracts plays a pivotal role. Transitional justice, truth-telling, apologies and community healing processes beyond addressing existing grievances and fostering social cohesion, also build peace capacities to solve future grievances. Thus, whether a political agreement will produce a resilient and unifying social contract that can lead to positive peace by asking people to live with those they believed were perpetrators, aggressors and illegitimate, depends on whether the peace process and governance institutions can adopt mechanisms that subsume positive security and inclusive and effective participation towards achieving positive peace. The prospect of positive peace needs to provide a strong overarching sense of justice and to address the fears, deprivations and isolations of groups by bringing them together; but the very process of peacemaking in Cyprus creates a conflict of interest and sense of anxiety because it entails not only the reconfiguration of inter-group relations that redefines our understanding of the other, but also reconfiguration of mature and rival subnational social contracts.

6.0 Analysis and Conclusions

Despite the growing literature on positive peace, peace processes in general are still very focused on high-level talks and agreements, with few to no inclusive participatory practices that engage different sections of society. The failure of high-level negotiations in Cyprus highlights that the process of building a unifying social contract for a federal Cyprus suffers from: (a) the deeply rooted reductionist approach that seeks to design a social contract from a binary ethnocentric position rooted in the 1960s and that no longer represents the current socio-political diversity of Cypriot society and its multi-layered identity; (b) a static and top-down view of social contract-building and society itself, where peacemaking and peacebuilding spheres have shown little reflection and flexibility regarding their ethnocentric parameters and exclusivist methodology; (c) strictly categorical and exclusionary logics underpinning approaches addressing core conflict issues such as security or power-sharing; and (d) the disregarding of the need to foster social cohesion at the vertical and horizontal levels to address the dissonance between peacemaking processes and society at large.

Subsequently, the absence of inter-communal social cohesion tilts civic loyalties towards separate institutions and further weakens the peace process, thus creating a vicious circle of cascading failure across the three drivers of the social contract. These fundamental shortcomings undermine the potential of the peace process to foster ownership and legitimacy and to produce a resilient social contract that can provide a sense of belonging and positive security to all its subjects. The analysis in this paper explains, at least partially, why the Cyprus Problem, which has outlasted several UN Secretary-Generals and dozens of UN Special Representatives and is home to one of the oldest UN Peacekeeping Missions, has proven to be so intractable. By illustrating the detrimental results of their absence, the case of Cyprus validates the importance of attending to the three drivers of the social contract in conflict transformation efforts and in achieving positive peace.

What is now needed in Cyprus is for policymakers and decision makers to find effective and stable ways to resolve core conflict issues as well as to develop the capacity to address future stressors and tensions among themselves through constructive dialogue, without withdrawing into their entrenched and polarised positions. Building institutional resilience for peace capacities to respond to the needs and frustrations of communities on the local level would not only complement and strengthen the societal resilience for peace capacities, but would also acknowledge and account for the co-constitutive nature of vertical and horizontal social cohesion and social contract-building. Exclusion from the peace process, as evidenced by Cypriot women's heightened insecurities and expectations

of fragility, often translates into scepticism and resistance towards the peace process. Thus, fostering inclusivity and participation would make the peace process and consequently its outcome more resilient as well.

From a policy practitioner perspective, and given the analytic framework of the three drivers of resilient social contracts, a roadmap for a more resilient social contract in Cyprus could include the following components: First, deepening and broadening the peace process by delving into the more substantial work of promoting a holistic and positive conceptualisation of security and building resilient, inclusive and participatory public sphere and decision-making structures. Second, reducing communal bias and ethnocentrism in existing separate governance institutions so that existing subnational social contracts start accommodating and contributing to the forging of a resilient unifying social contract, rather than undermining it by creating dissonance. And third, strategically engaging with citizens to build trust and foster social cohesion among citizens horizontally within communities, vertically between the institutions of the other community and across the divide.

From a scholarly perspective, the Cyprus case highlights the dynamics of competition between conflict-driven ethnocentric social contracts and inclusive social-contracting for sustaining peace. Cyprus teaches us how status quo can stabilize and endure in cases where the prospect of an inclusive national social contract is not as clearly expounded, nor does this prospect become as relevant to daily life, compared to the more vibrant, immersive, nurturing but ultimately polarizing ethnocentric subnational social contracts that each ethno-religious group enjoys in the relationship with its own leadership. Such deadlocks, it would seem, can only be broken if the prospect of a national social contract is approached from a more holistic and strategic perspective through an integrated approach that addresses core conflict issues in a way that will indeed lead to inclusive and effective service delivery, institutional legitimacy and social cohesion vertically and horizontally. Nothing less, it would seem, would be enough to overcome the allure of subnational ethnocentric social contracts in countries that experience protracted conflict.

NOTE ON CONTRIBUTORS

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